{"id":60444,"date":"2025-09-26T11:04:03","date_gmt":"2025-09-26T11:04:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/becolve.com\/blog\/industroyer-or-the-new-specific-malware-development-environment-for-industrial-control-systems\/"},"modified":"2025-09-26T11:04:03","modified_gmt":"2025-09-26T11:04:03","slug":"industroyer-or-the-new-specific-malware-development-environment-for-industrial-control-systems","status":"publish","type":"blog","link":"https:\/\/becolve.com\/en\/blog\/industroyer-or-the-new-specific-malware-development-environment-for-industrial-control-systems\/","title":{"rendered":"Industroyer or the New Specific Malware Development Environment for Industrial Control Systems"},"content":{"rendered":"

It has been 7 years since Stuxnet showed its face, seriously affecting industrial control systems. As is known, this APT was specifically developed to attack the distributed system of Siemens PCS7, the S7 series of PLCs and the SCADA WinCC<\/strong>. A total of up to 22 plants and more than 100,000 infected PCs were counted, although the best-known case is the one that affected the uranium enrichment plants in Iran, in particular the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant<\/strong> and the Natanz Nuclear Complex.<\/strong> <\/p>\n

On the other hand, in December 2016, the energy management infrastructure in Ukraine<\/strong> was the target of a cyberattack, leaving a fifth of the country’s electricity grid without power for 72 minutes (affecting more than 250,000 homes). This attack has been the subject of analysis and study, and recently, ESET has discovered and named the malware that carried out this attack Industroyer<\/strong> (Dragos has named it CrashOverride). <\/p>\n

If we take a look at the attack vectors used by Stuxnet<\/strong> to affect industrial control systems, we can see that Industroyer uses similar means.<\/p>\n